"Plenia". The team of Luis, John, and six key executive directors had decided to halt growth outside Venezuela to plan for globalization.
The team believed that Plenia Locatel success came from adhering to basic values and principles, of customer attention and customer service, plus commitment and long hours of hard work. Through a combination of the partners' personalities and skills, such as intuitive decision making and a passion for customer contact by Luis, and a thoughtful, analytic approach by John, the pair had built a hugely successful business. Franchising enabled leveraging of the partners' capital. Franchisees-most of whom had been personal friends of the founders-became trusted business associates and practitioners of the values in their own stores. The exemplary customer-oriented store behavior by employees, known as "Plenia Locatel Way," was seen as the key reason for the Plenia Locatel powerful brand recognition, industry admiration, customer loyalty, and financial success.
The eight executives were keenly aware of the need to continue the Plenia Locatel Way in stores while enabling growth with more formal strategy, structure, franchisee selection, and systems. Only a few of them had actually created or worked in such business conditions. For their part, both founders realized their operational involvement and expertise must give way to the next generation of leaders. The six other senior executives included three sons and a daughter of the founders.
Plenia Locatel Group had recently installed an information systems platform, consisting of SAP transactional systems and a point-of-sale system. Once fully stabilized, this platform was intended to enable the enabler of rapid expansion of stores, support proven business practices, and be a source of timely operational reports.
The questions facing the executives in 2009 were:
Exactly what new forms of business, in terms of strategy, reporting structure, business and operational models (especially franchising), and systems, should be adopted to ensure continued success with globalization? How could formalization and systemization be introduced while extending customeroriented, values-based practices, the Plenia Locatel Way, down to the store level in widely dispersed countries with different laws and cultures? What new roles, assignments, and skills would be needed for existing executives, and would any new outside talent be needed? How and when should further changes be introduced, and in what order?
History: Lessons and Legacies

A Partnership Is Formed
In 1971 Luis Ruah invited his childhood friend and brother-in-law, John Levy, to come to Venezuela and form a business partnership. Levy, with two advanced degrees, the latest an MBA from Columbia Business School in 1969, was working in the United States at Merck, Sharp, and Dohme. Luis and John had always wanted to be in business together. John remembers saying to his wife, "Why don't we try it for two years? We can always go back to France or the US. Let's see how it goes."
The partners began by importing novelty clothing and accessories, selling door-to-door. Luis pored over catalogues, looking for the next item that would catch the fancy of hotel travelers or others. John kept the books (see Exhibit 1). In 1979 they formed Galaxia Medica to import a variety of products including medical equipment to sell to wholesalers and doctors. There was no working capital. They occupied a tiny office, sat on wooden boxes, and used a cotton bale for a table. But from the beginning they were committed to customer service. When necessary, they delivered items in a taxi to doctors' offices, even if it meant losing money on the sale. As they both agreed in retrospect, "We knew we had to give impeccable service, to be better than the competition, and that's what we did."
A turning point in the business was "Viernes Negro" (Black Friday) 
Health Equipment and the Health Supermarket
In addition to health product importing, the partners began renting medical equipment. They reasoned that few wanted to buy wheelchairs, crutches, or walkers for a short recovery period, and there was no competition for this in Venezuela. They called the new business "Locatel," French for Location par Téléphone (rent by telephone, also an innovation in the country). The reputation of the partners among doctors helped. The business grew quickly.
In 1993 the partners bought a building for offices and inventory in an industrial area of Caracas. There was an empty floor which, as John remembered, "We didn't know what to do with." Mike Ruah, Luis's oldest son, had written his undergraduate thesis, at Universidad Metropolitana in 1992, on the family business, and included recommending the opening of a pharmacy. The pharmacy was intended to be a secondary business, to attract rental and equipment customers. Pharmaceuticals were priced at a 20% discount to customers who joined a membership program. In 1994 the one empty floor became the first "Locatel Automercado de Salud" (Health Supermarket).
The results astounded John and Luis. From the opening day there were lines into the streets waiting to get in. Contrary to expectations the store attracted customers from far outside the neighborhood, including many from upscale parts of Caracas.
After experimenting with the pharmacy, and seeing the crowds coming in, we understood that healthcare should be the core of the business. Then we said, "Why don't we add related services?" So we set up optometrist services and sold prescription glasses and then blood testing.
-John Levy
The new type of store was marketed aggressively and creatively. A particularly successful decision was to buy TV advertising in the middle of the night and early morning, when they were available cheaply and when a large percentage of viewers might be doctors, nurses, and sick patients; exactly the target market. Soon two more stores were opened, in different parts of Caracas, with rapid success. From 1999 to 2004 the number of stores grew from 6 to 37 (Exhibit 1). At one point, stores were being opened at the rate of one per month. Stores were almost universally successful. Most achieved breakeven in the first day of operation, compared to similar businesses in the United States which required over four years. Store sales grew from $10 million to $221 million. During this period, Locatel, through its stores and supply and wholesale business, became the number one player in the medical equipment market, and the number two player among the pharmacy retail chains, accounting for 5% of total sales of medicines in Venezuela. At the same time, Locatel was able to maintain a uniformly high quality of store appearance and service.
Franchising and Growing
Ratings by large suppliers and third-parties showed Locatel's brand image and consumer reputation were the best in its industry in the country.
The founders and executive directors maintained ownership and management of the first store, just below their corporate offices and were fully active in day-to-day operations and local expansion. Luis continued to look for new items and ideas, attending trade shows in the United States and Europe and regularly visiting the stores and talking with customers. In 2002 nutritional advisory services, vaccines, oxygen therapy, and oncology products were added to the Locatel store offering. Whenever a patient received a direct treatment in a store it was as a result of a physician's advice or from a consultation. Not all innovations were successful. Supplying dentists directly, for example, did not work out and was stopped after two years.
Luis, John, and Locatel executives were aware of the visibility of their brand and felt a responsibility to the larger community. In 1999 Venezuela suffered one of the worst natural disasters in its history. Torrential rains associated with a hurricane caused massive landslides on the coastline, killing an estimated 100,000 people and disrupting transportation and relief efforts. Locatel stores were one of the few places where people could buy products, and facilities were provided for donations. In Mexico the name "Locatel" was replaced by "Plenia" to avoid conflict with a Mexican institution, and because "Locatel" was usually associated with a telecom business. The official corporate name became "Plenia Locatel Group". In June of 2009, the brand image was renewed by changing the logo and store appearance, and consensus was reached that "Plenia" would be the brand used for future stores in new countries.
Approach to Management
The Plenia Locatel organization corporate organization in Venezuela, at the founder and executive team levels, was a mixture of individual responsibilities and informal teamwork. (See Exhibit 3 for the overall company organizational structure and Exhibit 4 for the country corporate level structure. These charts were adjusted in 2009 for the purpose of this case study.) Informality was enabled by the executive floor office layout. On one side was a long office in which John sat behind a desk at one end and Luis behind a desk at the other end, facing each other. Other offices were arranged around two other walls. It was unusual for a door to be closed. There was a consensus that more formality was needed, particularly as a basis for going global at scale and with rapid pace. In particular, Luis and John made efforts to delegate more of the day-to-day running of the business to the executive directors.
Franchising in Practice: Enabling Growth and Leverage
The Formal Side of Franchising
The idea of franchising originated with Luis and John. To instill values and principles into all stores, the formal rules and contracts were rigorous and explicit. Franchisees were carefully selected, with the intention of building trust.
Important features of the formal franchise arrangement were the following:
Franchisees put up 100% of the capital for construction, stocking, and completion of the store. (An opening in Venezuela averaged $4 million on top of construction cost.) Each store paid a royalty of 3% of revenue to Locatel Corporate, on a monthly basis. Each store was expected to contribute to marketing expenses of the corporate entity, amounting to 1% of sales. "Never stock out!" Stores were expected to carry inventory in excess of what might appear necessary, to sustain the reputation of Locatel for always having what a customer needed. This was particularly true for pharmaceuticals and prescription drugs. Inventory represented about $2 million for a new store. (The policy, in stark contrast to many competitive stores and other businesses in Venezuela, was believed by Plenia Locatel executives to be the key to the popular success of Locatel.) Each store ordered all but a few items through Locatel Corporate or Galaxia Medica, enabling bundling of orders and negotiation of better prices with suppliers (see Exhibit 5). Shipping and payment were generally between the suppliers and the stores, a feature Locatel Corporate felt insured transparency and trust on the part of the franchised businesses. Franchisees were required to be managers of their stores. While a single franchisee might own an interest in several stores, the manager in each store had to have an ownership interest in that store. Store owners were expected to be physically present during most store hours. In the Caracas area, each franchisee was assigned to a "zone," and his/her business could open other stores within the zone. This mechanism was seen as a prototype of what might be done internationally in multi-country regions and within a country.
A franchise was typically a family business itself. It was expected that all franchisees would meet with the corporate executives regularly. Other rules and expectations, particularly reflecting the values of customer service, were set out in the "Ten Commandments" which franchisees agreed to (Exhibit 6).
Franchising: The Informal Aspects
The first franchisee was a long-time friend of the family. The number of individual investors in franchises grew to 471 by 2009, including 366 in Venezuela (203 in Caracas), and the rest in Colombia, Florida, Russia, and Mexico. There were more than 50 franchised companies. By 2009, the minimum investment for an individual was $250,000, which went for real estate and construction, store setup and working capital, and other capital to carry the store to profitability. Only one franchise was terminated, for reasons of poor store management and potential damage to the Locatel brand. The franchisee had not been a personal friend of the founders, and the experience was seen in retrospect by the executive team as an indication of the need for in-depth due diligence in franchisee selection.
Franchisee meetings, with the corporate executive team, were held at corporate headquarters in Caracas every three weeks, with members of the corporate board of directors and the executive team present. Attendance invariably included the most senior member of each franchise business, or his/her immediate second. The meetings were used to announce policies and report and exchange progress reports, but also to discuss planning and direction for marketing promotions and to share ideas on store management. In their study, the team quickly confirmed the urgency for a new integrated administrative system which had to cover transactions in the Plenia Locatel product cycle from end-to-end. They wanted a system that digitized and optimized purchasing, inventory management, financials, store and corporate reporting, and more. The existing system was home-grown, and its maintenance was dependent on its creator, who worked full-time for Locatel Venezuela. Luis recalled the founders' position at the time: The team knew by the end of 2004 that system replacement was an opportunity to introduce a technology platform that could enable and support scaling and operations on a global basis.
In discussions with SAP and IBM, the team remembered the vendor representatives being surprised when they suggested they wanted a contract commitment for as long as ten years. A primary consideration, which turned into a significant problem for implementation, was that the system had to replicate and support specific and somewhat unique practices that had evolved in the business and in relationships between Corporate and the franchisees and stores. Both SAP and IBM assured the team that the system was adaptable and recommended that Locatel change certain business practices in the stores to minimize customization of the ERP package.
The total contractual commitment of $12 million was the largest single capital commitment in Plenia Locatel Group history. Franchisees would be expected to contribute license and implementation costs and a monthly fee for hosting and license maintenance. When the proposal was presented to John and Luis, they were stunned. But the team answered all their questions and obtained their consent.
Once the contracts were signed, the study team went to work on implementation, Also, Alejandro Implementation of the systems took two full years. Some discussions between the IBM consultants and process owners resulted in positive changes in the system while others took longer than expected and achieved no evident result. The system was cutover in phases, beginning in June 2006 with Galaxia Medica, the Locatel Venezuela corporate entity for purchasing and distribution and the most standard and controlled operation. This was followed by the first owned store in October and progressed until all Venezuela stores had a new POS hardware and system, and a new back-office system, in March 2007. The good news was that not a single day of store shut down was necessary during the implementation, despite the usual startup glitches, delays, and occasional need to run the stores with manual systems.
The Bad News: It Isn't Over
During the project, the cutover and installation required Ari Levy and a team to work around the clock. But it didn't stop there. After implementation Stanley, Alejandro, and Ari spent hours with IBM and SAP trying to get to the bottom of persistent stoppages, slow response time, and errors. They found that the operational servers had been undersized, and therefore had to be upgraded earlier than expected. This resulted in an unexpected increase in hosting fees. Implementation of the POS system was intended to be in parallel with the ERP transactions systems from SAP, but by 2007 it only supported the basic operations in SAP. Nevertheless, with the basic systems apparently stabilized, the team declared victory with a celebratory party in September, 2007. IBM produced a press release entitled, "Locatel builds global retail franchise with SAP and IBM," (see Appendix) in which it quoted Ari and Stanley making positive comments about the project and stated:
With a complete suite of SAP applications in place, Locatel has been able to define and control its business processes. The fully integrated SAP applications allow managers to view the business from end to end-from sales order to goods delivery, with matching financial reporting.
But problems with the system, annoying but never fatal, persisted. Some processes seemed inflexible and less efficient than before. Response time was slow for key transactions like purchasing, apparently due to some system customizations. After several months, the Plenia Locatel team came to the conclusion that fundamental processing problems existed in the software. Regular complaints to IBM led to little progress. SAP was largely immune, as they had not been contracted to provide consulting assistance. There was a growing sense that the expertise available from the vendors was not up to the task. Stanley, Alejandro, Walter, and Ari paid a visit to the head of SAP for Latin America in his office in Miami and laid out the issues. Reflecting on the experience, Plenia Locatel executives did some rough calculations of IT capital investments to date and going forward. The $12 million, ten-year program initiated in 2005 had been expected to represent all the capital investment necessary to achieve the new IT platform for ERP transactions and POS. The executives estimated that the actual investment to date was $7.4 million, including an overrun of $1.6 million compared to intended investments, or a 13% overrun. Looking forward, and including new functionality and investment as well as overrun, they estimated that total investment by 2015 would reach $17.5 million, 46% over the originally planned $12 million.
Despite these large numbers the Plenia Locatel Group executives had no regrets about the decision to adopt the SAP and POS systems. Luis and John were beginning to trust and rely on the daily reports of sales and other key information from the stores. There was general acknowledgement by the executives that the platform could serve to support stores and growth for globalization. A list of specific opportunities for process changes possible with the platform is in Exhibit 7.
The Store Experience
Locatel Corporate had an active and involved strategy not only for instilling the Plenia Locatel Way, but also for assisting franchisees and their stores to achieve sustained profitability.
Assessing and Assisting Stores
From the early days, it was recognized that different neighborhoods had different capacities to drive sales in a Locatel Venezuela store. Recognizing this, and in order to make comparisons and identify problems with a store, the stores were categorized into one of three types based on sales percentile:
A type I store was in the top 25 th percentile of store sales. A type II store was in the range from the top 25 th to bottom 25 th percentile of store sales.
A type III store was in the bottom 25 th percentile of store sales. Based on comparisons with peer stores, managers and Locatel Venezuela corporate executives would meet on an ad hoc basis to determine reasons for weak and strong performance of a store and set a plan for remedial actions. (See the organization chart for a typical store, Exhibit 11.) Involved in these reviews were typically Stanley Ruah for operational matters, Eurice Troya for financial matters, and Alejandro Planas for IT matters. Depending on particular problems, middle managers from Corporate in such areas as training, store layout, or scheduling of employee shifts would visit the store and make recommendations to the store owner/manager.
Business process standards and practices were continually updated in the Franchise Manuals. At the time of the SAP implementation, the manuals were completely rewritten. Plenia Locatel Group executives and consultants had analyzed every single Locatel Venezuela business process, compared it to the SAP "best practices" and created the final optimized processes. This effort required many iterations and resulted, at the end of 2008, in a set of Franchise Manuals totally consistent with Plenia Locatel's adaptation of the SAP transactional systems.
Corporate executives were generally pleased with the process for remedial action and achieving adherence to the best practices. At the same time, they knew the informal and face-to-face fixes and the busy IT help desk would be impossible to sustain as stores opened farther away and as the SAP platform was extended to regions beyond Venezuela and Mexico. Illustrative of potential problems was an exchange that took place in one of the stores in January 2009. In the meeting room in back of the store, Walter, Stanley, Alejandro, and Ari mentioned that the new manual for store operations was nearly final and would be out to the stores soon. One of the store owners responded with some passion: In discussions the next day, the corporate executives speculated that if it was difficult to introduce the system and new processes in Caracas, with store managers and employees they knew personally and could visit in a matter of minutes, how hard was it going to be between Caracas and Moscow or Madrid or Singapore, eventually?
Have we created a monster? Can an "empowered," trained, motivated workforce, thoroughly On a related matter, as they looked to grow outside Venezuela, the executives wondered what differences they could expect in the nature of markets, customer socio-economic levels, and national cultural traits and practices. How might these differences alter the successful models of store types, employee behavior, management of employees, supply chain, and comparisons among stores for corrective consultative action? The executives were beginning to absorb some lessons from the experience of new stores in Miami, but that experiment was still new and incomplete.
Visiting the Stores
In January 2009, visits to four Venezuelan stores, representing all three types, over a span of three days, led to conversations with store owners/managers, other employees, and several customers, and allowed for the observation of business interactions on current topics of concern between corporate executives and the store managers. Invariably, the stores were brightly lit, clean, and orderly, and there was an employee at the door, greeting every customer, offering to help, and answering questions. The prescription counters consistently had customers standing in line but always has as many cashiers as necessary to keep them served. A visitor's random conversations with customers and employees were always met with smiles and effusive, positive comments.
A Venezuelan woman on her way from Caracas to Miami was asked if she had heard of Locatel. She responded as follows: 
Yes. I have two houses in Caracas and
Exhibit 7 Process Changes Possible with the SAP Platform
The SAP system technology and process changes are designed to enable the following:
Product Coding: Each country corporate office (master franchise) decides what articles are in the product mix. However, the master data record is centralized and audited by the Plenia Locatel Group office. The purpose of this is to avoid duplicated records on the master article data, allowing the product mix of countries to be compared and enhanced. In the future uniform coding could allow Plenia Locatel Group to negotiate international purchasing agreements with multinational suppliers.
Purchasing Process: Each store makes its own decisions on purchasing quantities, but the frequency, price, product options and payment conditions are based on a purchasing catalog and calendar decided by each country corporate office. The purchase orders from each store are reviewed by country corporate to guarantee minimum quantities and appropriate product mix. If there is an issue, the purchase order is returned to the store for explanation or correction. Each country corporate office thus controls purchasing and deals directly with suppliers.
Inventory Visibility: Each store can view, modify and manage its own inventory. However, all the stores and country corporate offices can view the inventory of all stores, enabling a store out of stock on an item to refer customers to another store.
Business Intelligence Reports: Each store can only view their own performance indicator reports. Country corporate can view and compare reports of all their stores. Based on these comparisons country corporate can identify under-performing and over-performing stores.
Aggregate Sales Information: All sales are recorded on the IBM point of sale (POS) system at the store level, with detailed information. Every night the information is aggregated (products, quantities and type of payment) and sent to the group centralized SAP system in a batch transfer. Thus the aggregated information from every store is available to country corporate. Each store can see its numerical order ranking among all the country stores, but it cannot see the identification of other stores in the rankings. In future, once SAP CRM is implemented, detailed information on sales will be available on each store at the centralized system. Durable Medical Equipment Rental: The provider of this service at every store is the Distributor organization in each country, (e.g., Galaxia Medica in Venezuela). The country central office of the Distributor can have real-time control of these equipment inventories to allocate items across stores, plan for replenishment, and manage the rental contracts created in each store with customers.
Price Optimization: The country corporate office sets the price of every product sold at a Plenia Locatel store. To achieve this, the system enables a view of products by category, such as prescription pharmaceuticals, and presents information on inventory turnover and price comparisons with competition. In the future additional SAP functionality will allow making more sophisticated analysis, based on demand curves, for pricing decisions. 
